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Combining a behavioral agency perspective with research on multiple-agency conflicts, this
article examines factors affecting the implementation of equity-based incentive schemes in initial
public offerings (IPOs). With a unique sample of U.K. IPO companies between the years 1998
and 2002, it shows that conditional (performance-related) incentive schemes are negatively
associated with share ownership and board power of the IPO’s founding directors. However, the
retained ownership of venture capital firms is positively associated with the probability of
conditional incentive schemes. Board independence weakly effects on the toughness of executive
compensation. The article’s interesting findings suggest a number of avenues for a future analysis
of the governance development process in threshold firms.
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An increasing number of fast-growing firms face the decision to go public at different
stages of their life cycle, and the process of initial public offering (IPO) has had increasing
attention from academics (Jain & Kini, 1999; Ritter, 1987). Research on IPO companies has
focused predominantly on areas such as issue performance (Brennan & Franks, 1997;
Espenlaub & Tonks, 1998; Mikkelson, Partch, & Shah, 1997; Pham, Kalev, & Steen, 2003)
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and its relationships with general corporate governance parameters such as board structure
and characteristics (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Certo, Covin, Daily, & Dalton, 2001; Filatotchev
& Bishop, 2002). Within these diverse research streams, relatively little attention has been
given to the role of executive compensation with regard to the IPO company. Although
Beatty and Zajac (1994) argued the need for a more unified perspective on the control of
executive compensation in the IPO company, there is little understanding among academics
and practitioners of factors affecting the introduction of executive compensation schemes at
the time of IPO and their structural characteristics, such as their relation to various perfor-
mance targets established by the firm’s board and shareholders.
Financial economists and organization theorists have developed a substantial body of lit-
erature on factors driving executive compensation and its organizational outcomes (see
Conyon, Peck, Read, & Sadler, 2000, for an extensive literature review). Most of the executive
compensation studies have been rooted in labor economics and agency theory and have
focused predominantly on mature publicly listed companies. In recent years this research has
provided fuel for commentators to criticize the remuneration received by top executive directors.
Many U.S. studies have explored possible links between executive pay and the performance of
the company, but these links have been found to be weak or nonexistent (Berkema, Geroski,
& Schwalbach, 1997; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Within the United Kingdom, these links also
have not been strong (Conyon & Leech, 1994; Gregg, Machin, & Symanski, 1993; Main,
Bruce, & Buck, 1996). Some researchers have argued that the incorporation of share-based
incentive schemes can promote unethical reporting behavior by CEOs (Carson, 2003). This is
particularly important as it is estimated that in the late 1990s, nearly 80% of the rise in CEO
pay came from share options grants (Perel, 2003). More recently, research on compensation issues
in the mature listed company has been widened to encompass areas such as compensation and
option incentives (Conyon & Sadler, 2001), the structure of compensation contracts (Conyon
et al., 2000), and governance issues such as board control and remuneration committees
(Conyon & Peck, 1998). However, the structure and characteristics of executive share-based
compensation in the IPO company still remains unexplored, even though IPOs represent a
unique laboratory to study equity-based incentive pay schemes such as executive share
options and long-term incentive plans at a crucial time in the firm’s development, which is
often referred to as a strategic threshold (Filatotchev, Toms, & Wright, 2006).
IPO context provides a number of opportunities for the development of more fine-grained
analysis of various theoretical aspects associated with equity-based incentive schemes, such
as risk–incentive trade-off (Prendergast, 2002) or framing of risk preferences within a behavioral
agency framework (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). As Beatty and Zajac (1994, p. 315) have
argued, studying newer firms that are considering a wider variety of internal governance mech-
anisms may provide a particularly clear test of the agency-based contingency perspectives. For
example, the question of choice between conditional (hard) and unconditional (soft) share-
option schemes ultimately concerns the effects of hard or soft targets on risk-taking behavior,
but traditional agency-based corporate governance models are relatively silent on this issue
(Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998, p. 142). Beatty and Zajac emphasized that because IPO
firms may be particularly dependent on the existing top management team that usually
includes the original founders, they may be more sensitive to managerial preferences for
minimizing risk bearing than would larger firms.
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Furthermore, unlike large mature firms with diffused external shareholders, IPO firms come
to the stock market with more concentrated ownership patterns, with managers, founders, and
early-stage investors, such as venture capitalists (VCs), still retaining substantial equity stakes
after the flotation (Filatotchev, 2006). In a recent study, Arthurs, Hoskisson, Busenitz, and
Johnson (2008) have argued that the IPO firms provide a multiple-agency setting associated
with “conflicts of interest among more than one agent group” (p. 277). Such settings create a
potential both for conflicting voices among various principal groups (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, &
Grossman, 2002) and for agents’ conflicting choices concerning which principals’ interests
should have priority. For example, founders of the IPO firm, being large-block shareholders,
may be considered as principals to nonfounding executive directors. At the same time, these
founders may also retain executive positions, which turns them into agents of external share-
holders, such as VCs. Likewise, VCs may be principals to the executive directors as well as
agents to those who provide funds. However, multiple-agency research is silent with regard
to how interests and risk preferences of multiple principals or agents in the IPO firm influence
governance-related decisions such as the adoption of equity-based incentive schemes.
This article extends previous work in several ways. First, we make a contribution to cor-
porate governance research by integrating multiple-agency and behavioral-agency theories and
suggesting that combining them may help develop further agency-based models of executive
risk-taking behavior and attitudes toward different types of equity-based incentives. Second,
we develop further the multiple-agency framework by providing more fine-grained analysis
of the governance roles of executive and nonexecutive founders, who very often are in charge
of critical decision-making functions in entrepreneurial IPOs. The third contribution is that
we show how different incentives and risk preferences of key shareholder constituencies in
the IPO firm may affect the choice between soft and hard equity-based incentive schemes.
Our last contribution is to the behavioral agency view of the board’s governance functions.
By integrating behavior and multiple-agency perspectives, we argue that the specific board
characteristics, such as board independence and founders’ control over the board, may
determine the salience of multiple principals’ preferences, and therefore they should have a
significant impact on the toughness of executive remuneration schemes.
Conceptual Framework
Beatty and Zajac (1994, p. 315) argued that an IPO provides a unique opportunity to
examine compensation arrangements and governance relationships that become formalized
when an organization becomes an open corporation and its stock is openly traded for the first
time. Although an IPO leads to a significant amount of capital raised with the issue of shares,
it is often accompanied by the dilution of ownership from the existing shareholders to out-
side institutional and retail investors. Thus at the point of the IPO, founders and executives
face both an exciting growth period and an uncertain time as they place shares beyond their
control and into the open market. Agency theorists have argued that governance structures
should be put in place to realign the interests of insiders and outside shareholders (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976; Pagano, Panetta, & Zingales, 1998; Pagano & Röell, 1998), and linking
executives’ remuneration to conditional share-option schemes is often considered a powerful
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realignment mechanism. However, selecting equity-related incentive schemes may be problem-
atic when there are different, perhaps conflicting voices in an IPO because of the multiple agent
interests associated with different shareholder constituencies (Arthurs et al., 2008, p. 282).
Therefore, the IPO firm’s governance parameters may be an outcome of a complex pattern
of principals’ interests and agents’ risk preferences associated with distribution of ownership
and control within the newly listed firm (Filatotchev, 2006).
Building on the multiple-agency perspective of the IPO firm’s governance aspects (e.g.,
Arthurs et al., 2008; Filatotchev et al., 2006) and behavioral agency research (e.g., Westphal
& Zajac, 1995; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998), this article
argues that the IPO firm’s decisions to implement equity-based incentive schemes and the
extent of their toughness are not exogenous factors. Rather, they are linked to the distribu-
tion of retained ownership among multiple principals or agents, as well as their control over
the IPO firm’s board. We differentiate between the governance roles of four main groups of
shareholders—nonfounding executive directors, executive founders, nonexecutive founders,
and VCs—and consider their interests and risk preferences. Building on the behavioral
agency research, we argue that founding and nonfounding executives should exhibit strong
preferences for unconditional share-option schemes because their retained ownership leads
to loss aversion (as opposed to risk aversion) within a gain-framed context (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1986; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). However, the interests and risk prefer-
ences of nonexecutive founders and VCs underpin a strong principal perspective on execu-
tive remuneration, and building on risk–incentive tradeoff research (e.g., Prendergast, 2002),
we argue that in the uncertain environment of an IPO, these two groups of investors may sup-
port the development of conditional, performance-related incentive schemes (Zahra &
Pearce, 1989). Finally, we argue that the specific board characteristics, such as board inde-
pendence and founders’ control over the board, may determine the salience of multiple prin-
cipals’ preferences, and therefore these characteristics should have a significant impact on
the toughness of executive remuneration schemes. The following sections develop these
arguments further and suggest a number of testable hypotheses. We start our analysis with
corporate governance aspects of share ownership of hired, nonfounding directors. Then we
consider dual agency roles of executive and nonexecutive founders and early-stage investors.
Our theoretical discussion concludes with analysis of the impact of board characteristics on
the choice between conditional and unconditional share options in the IPO firm.
Multiple Agents, Ownership Structure,
and Equity-Based Incentive Schemes
In their seminal article on corporate governance, Jensen and Meckling (1976) indicated
that the flotation of a company’s shares on the public market leads to the principal–agent
concern: how to reconcile the interests of incumbent managers and executive directors (as
agents) with those of the company’s ultimate owners—external shareholders (as principals).
Corporate governance research suggests that appropriate mechanisms need to be put in place
to motivate directors to align their own interests more closely with the shareholders’, thus
ensuring goal congruence. Incentive schemes for executive directors that are based on share
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options have been discussed as the key way to help overcome agency problems (Beatty &
Zajac, 1994; Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Murphy, 1985), with greater amounts of the
managers’ compensation being tied directly to the performance of the company (Jensen &
Murphy, 1990). At the point of the IPO, this issue becomes particularly relevant because a
gradual process of professionalization of entrepreneurial ventures is usually accompanied by
an increasing importance of hired, nonfounding executives (Daily & Dalton, 1992; Willard,
Krueger, & Feeser, 1992). Indeed, some authors have argued that one of the reasons for a pri-
vate company to go public is a possibility of introducing share-based incentive schemes for
nonfounding key employees (Pagano & Röell, 1998).
Traditional agency arguments that the implementation and use of compensation schemes
can potentially mitigate the misalignment of managerial incentives and associated agency
problems have been challenged by studies of the incentive–risk trade-off (Beatty & Zajac,
1994; Holmstrom, 1979; Prendergast, 2002). This research has argued that linking a man-
ager’s remuneration too closely to firm performance could potentially lead to risk-avoiding
behavior by the manager. While it can be argued that equity-based and performance-based
compensation can have desirable motivational aspects, it may also cause the manager to have
undesirable risk-bearing characteristics. Rappaport (1981, 1999) argued that managers, who
act as the agents of the shareholders, are more risk averse than the owners of the company.
Unlike owners of the company, who are able to diversify their ownership portfolio, managers
have already invested their nondiversifiable human capital in the firm (Balkin & Gomez-
Mejia, 1990; Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992). As Scholes (1992) argued,
Managers are more likely to attach significantly more value to a given level of cash than to the
same expected level in stock or options because they can use this cash to buy a diversified port-
folio of common stock, bonds, or whatever. (p. 123)
In terms of compensation issues, the most significant part of risk bearing for executives is
the acceptance of equity-based compensation within their compensation contract. Any form
of equity-based pay will cause the executive to bear risk that could otherwise be more
efficiently borne by the shareholders, who are able to diversify their investments. As a con-
sequence of this, executives are more likely to have a preference for cash payment than for
share options (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). This shift in managerial preferences may be particularly
dramatic when incentive schemes are tied to tough measures linked to company performance,
such as earnings per share, total shareholder return, and market share prices (Fama & Jensen,
1983). If company risk is high, then any proportion of remuneration that is equity based will
be further loaded, not only with nondiversifiable risk, but also with company risk. As such,
executives and shareholders will face very different levels of risk, and these risks can hinder the
alignment of the two groups in the context of pay schemes that link pay to performance
(Gray & Cannella, 1997; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998).
Both agency arguments and the risk–incentive trade-off framework imply that risk pref-
erences of managers may be contingent on the value of managers’ equity holdings. From the
traditional agency perspective, the higher the managers’ equity position, the less severe the
agency incentive problem, making it less likely that firms will need to use stock options in
their compensation contracts. Similarly, the risk–incentives research argues that high equity
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stakes in the firm mean that managers are relatively less diversified, and stock-based incen-
tives would lead to their risk aversion. Both theories suggest that managerial ownership
should be negatively related to the probability of hard performance contracts, ceteris paribus
(Beatty & Zajac, 1994).
However, in the context of an IPO, this argument may be contested, considering the
possible dilution of executive equity during the process of listing (Baker & Gompers,
2003; Certo, Daily, Cannella, & Dalton, 2003), especially if dilution occurs when the orig-
inal shareholders partially exit by selling some of their equity in the IPO. Because dilution
through the sale of existing shares may increase the extent of diversification of the execu-
tives, the multiple-agency framework (Arthurs et al., 2008) suggests that this increase in
diversification, combined with their retained equity in the focal company, should bring
nonfounding executives into closer alignment with other principals and change their risk
preferences. As a result, executives may want to obtain some upside gains associated with
conditional share options, and when controlled for share dilution, the effects of executive
share ownership on conditional stock options should be neutral or positive.
More recent behavioral agency research (e.g., Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996; Wiseman &
Gomez-Mejia, 1998) has helped untangle this complex web of incentive–risk problems asso-
ciated with executive ownership and stock options. By combining agency arguments with
prospect theory research (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986), these
authors have suggested that executives’ risk preferences and decisions may be driven by
problem framing, with their equity stakes being an important contingency affecting this
framing. More specifically, an executive’s current wealth may provide only a point of refer-
ence for assessing the prospects as opposed to directly influencing the preference for risk
(Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998, p. 134). These arguments may have particular relevance
in the context of IPO firms.
Even though there is a direct dilution of ownership at the time of the listing, founding
and nonfounding executive directors usually retain a significant proportion of ownership
at IPO (Filatotchev, 2006). The lock-up restrictions on equity trading after the IPO may
create transaction costs that prevent executives from adjusting their equity holdings to an
optimal level (Beatty & Zajac, 1994). Therefore, the magnitude of the retained equity
positions after the IPO may influence executives’ willingness to accept further risk bear-
ing in their compensation contract. More specifically, using locked-up executive equity
as a reference point for framing problems as gain or loss, behavioral models predict that
executives should exhibit risk-averse preferences when considering the appropriateness
of different types of incentive schemes within a gain context. It seems likely that
members of an executive team see the IPO as a milestone of success and have high expec-
tations for the future (Arthurs et al., 2008; Certo et al., 2001; Certo et al., 2003). Wiseman
and Gomez-Mejia (1998) argued that this situation may shift executives’ preferences from
risk avoidance to loss avoidance and that executives may become more concerned with
avoiding loss of perceived wealth than with attracting additional wealth. This results in
more conservative risk-averse posture. These arguments imply that higher levels of retained
executive equity after the IPO should influence the executives’ risk preferences away from
tough conditional share-option schemes and toward less-risky, unconditional schemes.
Hence, we suggest
6 Journal of Management / Month XXXX 
Hypothesis 1: The probability of conditional equity-based incentive schemes’ being present in the
remuneration contracts of executive directors in the IPO firm is negatively associated with the
level of retained ownership by the nonfounding executive directors.
Previous studies of entrepreneurial IPOs have recognized the continuing, albeit diminishing,
centrality of the founding team in the life of the threshold firm (Amit, Glosten, & Muller,
1990; Certo et al., 2001; Willard et al., 1992). Entrepreneurship research also indicates that
the ability of the young firm’s founders to formulate and implement strategic initiatives that
capitalize on environmental opportunities is vital to organizational growth and survival
(Finkle, 1998; Jayraman, Khorana, & Nelling, 2000; Steier & Greenwood, 2000). Therefore,
founder characteristics such as motivation and incentives have a direct impact on the firm’s
development and success in the long run (Daily & Dalton, 1997).
However, as mentioned above, the IPO process is accompanied by significant shifts in the
distribution of ownership and control between founding and new shareholders that create
misalignment of incentives and a related set of agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976;
Mello & Parsons, 1998). As Pagano and Röell (1998) have pointed out, “In this situation the
main conflict of interest is that between the controlling shareholder and the minority share-
holders, rather than between hired managers and the generality of shareholders” (p. 188). In
addition, during the process of professionalization of the firm before it comes to an IPO,
some founders may step down from executive positions and move to nonexecutive roles
(Willard et al., 1992), and this change arguably aligns their interests with interests of exter-
nal, minority shareholders.
Therefore, entrepreneurial IPO firms provide a setting in which multiple-agency problems
are particularly salient (Arthurs et al., 2008). More specifically, the firm’s founders are, as a rule,
majority shareholders, and as principals they should monitor executive directors (Sapienza &
Gupta, 1994; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003). At the same time, they continue to serve in
top executive positions, including the CEO position. However, the process of professional-
ization makes the founder cohort less homogeneous because some founders may have moved
to nonexecutive roles. Therefore, the multiple-agency perspective should be augmented by
considering potential differences in governance roles of executive and nonexecutive
founders, and this research represents one of the first steps in this direction.
Behavioral agency arguments outlined above suggest that the framing of executive attitudes
toward conditional share-option schemes depends on the amount of executive wealth associated
with the IPO firm. It is the amount of perceived risk borne by the agents that affects their will-
ingness to accept hard conditions attached to incentives. Founding executives, in addition to their
financial wealth, have a substantial amount of human capital invested in their firm. Moreover,
their long tenure, from the firm’s inception to its IPO, creates strong psychological attachment
to the firm, so its success and survival become part of a founder’s identity (Arthurs et al., 2008).
Therefore, from the behavioral agency perspective, founders’human capital investment and long
tenure should be additional framing factors that reinforce negative attitudes toward additional
risk associated with conditional share options.
On the other hand, nonexecutive founders may see themselves more as principals than
as agents, especially when they retain a substantial equity stake in the firm after stepping
down from their executive roles. In a complex environment of IPO, although they still may
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be able to monitor executives’ inputs, it is likely for them to have less knowledge about what
the executives should spend their time on (Prendergast, 2002). Because nonexecutive
founders are likely to have withdrawn from the strategy-making process and other key exec-
utive decisions, they have a reduced ability, compared with executive founders, to understand
and evaluate executive decisions. In this case, the framing of decisions of executive and
nonexecutive founders should be different, and in the absence of an effective mechanism of
monitoring and evaluating complex positions when the optimal action is hard to pinpoint,
nonexecutive founders are more likely to respond by offering the executives a pay-for-perfor-
mance contract (Prendergast, 2002). This incentive will be stronger, the greater the wealth of
the nonexecutive founders that is at stake.
These arguments extend multiple-agency research by suggesting that executive and
nonexecutive founders may have different risk attitudes and governance roles within the IPO
firm, with executive founders aligning their preferences with other executives but nonexec-
utive founders moving closer to the principal end of the spectrum. Hence, we suggest two
linked hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: The probability of conditional equity-based incentive schemes’ being present in the
remuneration contracts of executive directors in the IPO firm is negatively associated with the
level of retained ownership by the executive founders.
Hypothesis 2b: The probability of conditional equity-based incentive schemes’ being present in the
remuneration contracts of executive directors in the IPO firm is positively associated with the
level of retained ownership by the nonexecutive founders.
Apart from insiders, entrepreneurial IPOs very often have external block holders, such as
VCs. These investors provide equity finance at early stages of the venture’s life cycle. As a
result of this long-term involvement with the venture, VCs have increased incentives to monitor
both the decision plans and decision outcomes of managers (Brav & Gompers, 1997;
Carpenter, Pollock, & Leary, 2003). In particular, VCs impose contractual restraints on man-
agerial discretion, including the use of staged investment, an enforceable nexus of security
covenants, and the option to replace the entrepreneur as manager unless key investment
objectives are met (see Megginson & Weiss, 1991, for a discussion). Therefore, from the
agency perspective, VCs are unique principals in the IPO firm with superior monitoring
capacities that should compensate for a relatively weak incentive alignment associated with
nonconditional executive share options.
However, the multiple-agency framework suggests a different picture of the governance roles
of VCs. Although VCs are principals to a focal IPO firm, they are also agents to those who pro-
vide their investment funds (Arthurs et al., 2008). Despite the fact that VCs often use an IPO as
an exit opportunity, a substantial part of their equity holding still remains with the IPO firm
because of the lock-up arrangements, which may last for more than a year (Filatotchev, 2006).
Therefore, the pressure to show returns from their investment may last long after the IPO date,
and this situation puts a serious burden on the monitoring capacity of VCs (Arthurs et al., 2008).
As a result, there may be a strong argument that VCs’ retained ownership after an IPO may lead
to an increase in the probability of adopting performance-related share options.
First, the management literature has recognized increasingly that IPO is an important
strategic stage in the life cycle of entrepreneurial firms, often referred to as the rebirth or
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restart of organizations (Finkle, 1998, p. 6). At this critical juncture, a firm has overcome the
first challenges of its entrepreneurial phase and entered a growth stage. As Fama and French
(2004) emphasized, an IPO “is the point of entry that gives firms expanded access to equity
capital, allowing them to emerge and grow” (p. 229). Prendergast (2002) argued that in this
complex strategic environment, it is difficult to write an input-based contract because there
is no clear understanding of what the agent should be doing; to provide such an incentive
would involve frequent and complex recontracting. She suggested that “the purpose of offer-
ing conditional pay schemes is not simply to induce effort, since an input-based contract
could do this, but to induce executives to carry out the right kinds of efforts” (p. 1091).
Second, because VCs’ special rights associated with a venture capital contract end at the time
of an IPO, when the need for oversight is particularly great, VC investors may compensate
for a relative loss of control by strengthening other governance mechanisms, such as by
increasing incentive alignment through conditional share options (Black & Gilson, 1998).
Finally, although behavioral agency theorists did not explicitly study behavior of VCs, their
arguments, combined with the multiple-agency perspective on VCs, suggest that because of
the finite time horizons associated with lock-up arrangements, VCs may shift their reference
point toward encouraging executives’ risk exposure by introducing conditional share-option
schemes. These arguments are consistent with empirical evidence related to more mature
listed firms. For example, David, Kochhar, and Levitas (1998) found that the nature of own-
ership in U.S. firms was an important determinant of CEO compensation. In particular their
research supported the case that institutional investors (with only an investment relationship)
showed preferences toward lower overall levels of cash compensation with an increase in the
proportion of compensation received from long-term incentives. Thus,
Hypothesis 3: The probability of conditional equity-based incentive schemes’ being present in the
remuneration contracts of executive directors in the IPO firm is positively associated with pres-
ence of a retained ownership by VCs after the IPO.
Board Characteristics and Equity-Based
Incentive Schemes
In the previous section, we linked the type of executive share-option schemes to the pat-
terns of ownership and control in the IPO firm. Using the multiple-agency framework, we
argued that there may be tension between the governance roles of executive and nonexecu-
tive founders, executive directors, and VCs in terms of defining toughness of executive
incentive schemes. Here we extend these arguments further by suggesting that compensation
design may also depend on board parameters of the IPO firm, because this decision is ulti-
mately a prerogative of the board and its committees. Therefore, board characteristics should
have a bearing on the risk–incentive trade-off associated with executive share options.
From the agency perspective, to change managerial risk orientation and align managers’
interests with the interests of principals, firms not only need to set up incentive systems but
should also make sure that the board is actively involved in the critical functions of active
monitoring and evaluation of decisions made by the CEO and other top management team
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members (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The effectiveness of these monitoring and control functions
has usually been related to the extent of board independence and has often been approximated
by structural factors such as the proportion of outsiders on the board, CEO and chairperson
roles held jointly or separately, and so forth (Daily & Dalton, 1997; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).
Beatty and Zajac (1994, p. 317) suggested that a higher level of monitoring by boards would
be required when executives resist accepting compensation risks tied to firm performance.
They stressed that traditional agency studies have emphasized the primacy of incentive align-
ment in terms of dealing with agency problems, with monitoring being related to the magnitude
of incentive gap. This line of argument suggests that monitoring should be a substitute for
deficient managerial incentives.
This view has been challenged by research on corporate governance as a system of
interdependent elements, which explores how governance practices interact and potentially
complement each other as related bundles of practices (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, &
Jackson, 2008; Rediker & Seth, 1995; Walsh & Steward, 1990). Governance practices here
are not seen as being universally applicable. Rather than isolated best practices, corporate
governance practices become effective only in particular combinations. Complementarities
concern such interactions between practices and how these interdependencies align governance
to potentially diverse organizational environments. Therefore, monitoring may be complemen-
tary to incentive systems associated with executive stock options.
These arguments may be particularly relevant within the multiple-agency context, in
which principal–agent dualities lead to different risk–incentive trade-offs among share-
holder constituencies of the IPO firm. Therefore, apart from controlling the executives’
actions and evaluating their performance, monitoring in this context should also involve
setting and communicating performance standards to the executives. Behavior agency the-
orists argue that these standards should be strongly related to the principals’ preferences.
As Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) suggested, “unambiguous communication of these
standards results in clear performance targets for the executive, which . . . should influence
an agent’s aspirations or reference point for success” (p. 144). If boards are vigilant in
their role of protecting interests of noninsider shareholders, then the standards they set
should be higher than the standards set by the agent. When this logic is applied within the
multiple-agency context, it becomes clear that the specific board characteristics, such as
board independence and founders’ control over the board, may determine the salience of
principals’ preferences, and therefore board characteristics should have a significant
impact on the choice of incentive schemes.
In the context of IPOs, executive directors are very often the original founders of the IPO
firm, and previous research has suggested that the founder status of the CEO or chairperson
may be an important dimension of executive power within the organization that leads to an
executive capture of the board (Daily & Dalton, 1992; Ensley, Pearson, & Amason, 2002).
In previous sections we argued that decision framing and risk preferences of founding and
nonfounding executives are geared toward risk reduction associated with soft performance
targets. As a result, in the presence of founders’ control over the board and executive cap-
ture, performance targets should be lower, reflecting the agents’ desire to establish accessible
goals that reduce employment risk and ensure contingent pay (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia,
1998). Hence,
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Hypothesis 4: The probability of conditional equity-based incentive schemes’ being present in the
remuneration contracts of executive directors in the IPO firm is negatively associated with the
presence of founders who are the CEO or chairperson.
On the contrary, board independence may tip the balance away from the interest of insiders
toward protecting preferences of external shareholders and nonexecutive founders. Board
independence enhances the vigilance of monitoring (Daily, Johnson, & Dalton, 1999;
Golden & Zajac, 2001; Gulati & Westphal, 1999; Pfeffer, 1972; Shivdasani & Yermack,
1999; Westphal, 1999), especially at those points in the life cycle of the firm that involve
strategic transition (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999). Sociocognitive studies of corporate boards
have extended agency research by suggesting that proactive behavior by independent directors
may also be driven by the strategic perspective and base of experience provided by their
appointments to other organizations (Carpenter, 2002; Carpenter & Westphal 2001; Westphal,
1999; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). Therefore, we may expect that independent directors will
appreciate the importance of conditional equity-based compensation schemes as they grad-
ually become a good governance standard in more mature listed firms. Board independence,
therefore, should relate to the difficulty of performance targets and, thus, to the executives’
reference point of success (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Hence,
Hypothesis 5: The probability of conditional equity-based incentive schemes’ being present in the
remuneration contracts of executive directors in the IPO firm is positively associated with the
level of board independence.
Data and Method
The Sample
The data sample used in this analysis comprises a unique data set of founder-led IPO com-
panies in the United Kingdom. The data have been sourced both from the London Stock
Exchange New Issues Listing and from the Market Information and Analysis section, which
hold historical fact sheets for all issues since 1998 (including companies issuing additional
shares, readmissions, and transfers between markets). The data sample has been collected from
those companies floated on the London Stock Exchange (Main Market and the Alternative
Investment Market) over a 5-year period from January 1, 1998, to December 31, 2002.
For the given period, the London Stock Exchange lists show us that 872 companies were
floated as IPOs. Any company with non-U.K. incorporation was excluded as retaining it
might lead to inclusion of different governance structures. The IPO prospectuses for all
remaining 766 U.K. companies were obtained from Thomson Research, which provides
comprehensive coverage of company filings for publicly quoted U.K. companies. Missing
prospectuses were obtained either via company Web sites, or by telephone or written request
to the companies or their advisors, whichever was deemed more appropriate. Any company
deciding on U.K. flotation must produce a prospectus and file it with the Stock Exchange.
Each prospectus was examined, and particular emphasis was given to the section detailing
the history and founders of the company. Any companies that were unit or investment trust
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were excluded from the sample first (because they have particular governance characteris-
tics); then those deemed to involve a demerger, merger or acquisition, corporate spin-off,
equity carve-out, or reorganization or that could be considered as solely acquisition vehicles
were excluded (Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002). This resulted in 311 companies that clearly
demonstrated that they had been developed via the entrepreneurial process with entrepre-
neurial founders and whose founders were serving as directors at the time of the company’s
flotation. Because our focus is on the decision to adopt conditional versus nonconditional
share-option schemes, we excluded an additional 16 companies that did not have an execu-
tive share-option scheme at the time of IPO. Our final sample included 295 companies. Their
listing prospectuses provide a wealth of information, including details of the company’s
financial history, background details about the board of directors and the directors’ compen-
sation contract, share ownership, and details of any equity-based incentive schemes, thus
enabling the data variables to be collected from each company’s document. 
Measures
Dependent variable. The dependent variable in this study is dichotomous and is measured
as the presence of any conditional equity-based remuneration scheme (i.e., with specific
performance criteria to be achieved in order for grants to vest) at the point of IPO. This infor-
mation was taken primarily from the IPO prospectus, which gives details of such schemes to
future investors. To ensure accuracy, where details in the prospectus were vague, and to
prevent the possibility of missing data or a wrong assumption, annual reports and accounts
after the IPO were checked with reference to the scheme date in the IPO prospectus.
Independent variables. Ownership of the company is stated in the prospectus in the section
detailing “Directors’ and Others’ Interests” within the “Additional Information” in the prospectus.
As a rule, the ownership in this section is broken down into the number of shares held by each
director on the board and the percentage of the total equity held by each individual member.
Details both prior to and at the time of the IPO are given together in this one section. Additional
information about voting rights and whether the shares are beneficial or nonbeneficial is also
stipulated, providing sufficient information for exact ownership details to be calculated. For this
research, ownership details were carefully collated for each individual director, and the position
on the board (CEO, chair, executive director, or nonexecutive director) was noted. Also, a
dichotomous variable was created to indicate whether a board member was a founder of the
company. By combining this information, the retained ownership variables were created for
executive and nonexecutive founder–directors and other, nonfounder executives.
Later on in the same section of the prospectus, block holders (having greater than 3%
share ownership) are also cited, thus enabling the identification of VC involvement.
Attention was given to the section detailing any block investors in order to create a dummy
variable indicating whether the company had retained ownership by VCs after the IPO.1
Names of the block holders were identified and checked against the British Venture Capital
Association list of membership (British Venture Capital Association, 2003).
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The extent of founders’ control over the board was operationalized by collating informa-
tion relating to the position of the founders on the board of directors. Founders were often
in key roles, such as the CEO or chair, and on occasion these roles were held dually. To mea-
sure this, a dummy variable, “CEO/Chair–Founder duality,” was created. This variable was
assigned a value of 1 if the roles of the CEO and chair were combined and held by a founder
of the firm, and 0 otherwise. On the basis of previous research, a continuous variable mea-
suring the ratio of independent (nonexecutive in the United Kingdom) directors to the total
number of board members was used to operationalize the extent of board structural inde-
pendence (see Filatotchev, 2006, for an extensive discussion).
Control variables. Several control variables were used. The sample of entrepreneurial
IPO companies bridges a 5-year period that covers a bullish peak in the market midway and
then a slower bear market. As a result of this market fluctuation, a dummy variable was cre-
ated to indicate flotation before the peak (April 2000).
To moderate for the method of issue and the market floated, an additional dummy variable
was created for those companies that floated via the placing method. With a placing, shares
are sold directly to selected institutional investors. While this method gives the company more
discretion to choose its investors, it results in a narrower shareholder base, which may have
an effect on involvement of block holders (Pike & Neale, 2003). Similarly, companies float-
ing on the Alternative Investment Market were identified by a coded dummy variable.
Because the ex ante IPO’s risk is an unobservable and multidimensional factor, we used
a number of proxies to operationalize it. In line with previous research on IPO companies,
the first measurement for risk was taken from the risk factors discussed in the prospectus.
These were simply counted to provide a continuous measure of the risk of the firm, and a
number of studies consider this measurement to be an adequate proxy for the risks sur-
rounding a firm (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Certo et al., 2001; Cyr, Johnson, & Welbourne,
2000). A second measure for risk was created on the basis of the strength of the present exec-
utive team, with particular reference to the founder executives. A dichotomous variable was
created to indicate whether the loss of founder or key personnel within the executive team
was mentioned within the risk factors (1 = yes, 0 = no). If such a loss had occurred, it
would be a particular risk to the further performance and direction of the company.
The third proxy measure for risk was derived from the profitability (or unprofitability) of
the firm as disclosed to future investors in the IPO prospectus. Unfortunately, because of the
age of many of the firms, a trend variable proved to be impractical. So in line with previous
research, a dichotomous measure was created (1 = profitable, 0 = unprofitable; Beatty &
Zajac, 1994). The fourth measure for risk also reflected the profitably or unprofitability of
the firm. This was an expansion of the dichotomous measure above in that the variable was
made ordinal over the 4-year period prior to the IPO. No trading or a loss disclosed in any
single year prior to the IPO was given the value of 1. Summing the values for each year gave
a rank of 0 to 4. Hence over the 4-year period, companies with 0 were considered to have
very low risk, compared with companies with a 4, meaning 4 years of either no trading or
losses, which were assessed as indicating very high risk.
Because these proxies are not without weaknesses, we introduced an ex post measure-
ment of risk based on stock price volatility, measured by taking the standard deviation of the
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first 30 days’ trading prices for the shares. Finally, we used a sectoral measurement of risk
by creating a high-tech-company dummy for firms from high-tech industries such as infor-
mation technology, computers and software, and so forth.
The age of a firm was used to control for its sophistication because its organizational
structure and the development of governance systems may be linked to a life cycle develop-
ment effect. Previous research within mature companies has shown that size might also be
seen as a determinant of the executive compensation contract (Conyon et al., 2000; Gregg
et al., 1993). To control for the size of the IPO company, two variables were considered: the
market capital value of the firm at the point of the IPO and turnover in the year prior to the
IPO. Using market capital value at the time of the IPO to control for size has specific prob-
lems. The value placed on the share price might be influenced by the adoption of governance
factors, including the provision of equity-based incentive schemes (Beatty & Zajac, 1994;
Certo, 2003; Certo et al., 2003). Indeed, market capitalization may be undervalued as infor-
mation asymmetries between the various teams involved in the IPO process can lead to
underpricing (when the initial offer price is less than the 1st-day close-of-trade price; Certo
et al., 2001; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; Michaely & Shaw, 1994). Alternatively, gover-
nance signals (including retained ownership levels) may have a positive effect on the value
of the firm (McBain & Krause, 1989; Mikkelson et al., 1997). With these factors in mind,
the measure of market capitalization as a control for the size of the organization might have
considerable endogenous and exogenous influences. For this reason, sales turnover was used
to provide an adequate control for the size of the firm.
As indicated in the theory section, dilution of ownership can also influence adoption of
performance-based incentives. To control for this, dilution of the founders and other non-
founder executive directors was measured as the percentage difference between the shares
owned prior to and at the point of the IPO.
Analytical Technique
Ordinary least squares regression analysis makes the assumption that any linear model is
continuous, homoskedastic, and normally distributed. Thus, with the dependent variable
being the presence of conditional equity incentive schemes within the compensation contract
of the executives, the use of ordinary least squares regression to model this data is inappro-
priate. When the dependent variable is of a dichotomous nature, a more appropriate tool is
multiple discriminant analysis or a logistic regression model (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, &
Black, 1998). In most applications of this nature, the logit and probit models are quite sim-
ilar, with the main difference being that the logistic distribution has slightly flatter tails
(Gujarati, 2003). For comparison, both logit and probit models have been run on the vari-
ables. The results for both models were similar, with only marginal differences in the levels
of significances. With such similar results, only those of the logit model have been reported.
Empirical Results
Tables 1 and 2 provide the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix and for all vari-
ables used in the study. Of the sample of 295 companies, 49.2% of the executive share-option
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schemes had some form of performance criteria attached in order for shares to vest to the
executives if these conditions were met (or exceeded). The large number of companies oper-
ating schemes at the IPO shows the importance attached to these schemes, both internally
and externally.
Table 1 also shows that founder directors were by far the predominant group of insider
shareholders, retaining more than 30% of voting shares after the IPO on average. Founders
in executive roles represented the largest block owners, holding on average 27.74% of total
shares. Clearly, our data are consistent with the multiple-agency framework suggesting that
founders could be considered as agents and principals, depending on the context. Other non-
founder executives’ ownership was relatively low, at 4.32%, and 27% of IPOs in our sample
had VC backing at their IPO.
In terms of board structure, independent directors held 42% of board seats on average.
However, the inclusion of nonexecutive founders who continued to have ownership (mean,
3%) might bring the levels of true independence into question. A founder was the firm’s
CEO or chair in more than 80% of cases, indicating that founders had retained strong lead-
ership positions even at the IPO stage.
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Table 1
Means, Median Values, and Standard Deviations
Variables M Median or %a SD
Dependent variable
• At IPO presence of any conditional share-option scheme 49.21
Independent variables
• Nonfounder executives’ ownership (%) 4.32 1.17 7.19
• Executive founders’ ownership (%) 27.74 23.60 21.61
• Nonexecutive founders’ ownership (%) 3.14 0.00 10.67
• Venture capitalist–backed company 27.00
• CEO/chair founder 86.78
• Board independence 41.93 40.00 14.04
Control variables
• Annual turnover (£,000) 22,128 2,719 90,703
• Age of company (years) 6.48 5.00 6.44
• No risk factors 11.96 10.00 7.43
• Departure of key personnel 70.34
• (Un)profitability risk 61.00
• Previous trading/(un)profitability 2.59
• Share price volatility 47.70 7.01 299.03
• Float date pre-dot-com bubble 30.51
• Technology company 29.00
• Founders’ dilution (%) 13.12 10.41 14.57
• Executives’ dilution (%) 2.40 0.36 6.53
• Placing method 84.00
• Alternative Investment Market flotation 71.00
a. Percentages are reported for the 0/1 variables.
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Table 2
Correlation Matrix for All Variables
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 At IPO, presence 1
of any conditional
scheme
2 Nonfounder .068 1
executives’
ownership (%)
3 Executive −.010 −.063 1
founders’
ownership (%)
4 Nonexecutive −.096 −.040 −.252** 1
founders’
ownership (%)
5 Venture .089 −.173** −.211** −.002 1
capitalist–backed
company
6 CEO or −.072 −.057 .288** −.007 −.050 1
chair founder
7 Board −.003 −.241** −.312** .182** .164** −.091 1
independence
8 Annual .096 .085 −.043 .046 .079 .031 .002 1
turnover
(£, 000)
9 Age of .166** .091 .065 −.035 .139* −.020 −.005 .401** 1
company
10 No risk factors .039 −.150* −.146* .136* .210** −.063 .270** .236** .048 1
11 Departure of −.147* −.041 −.036 −.123* −.003 −.084 .003 .020 −.116* .175**
key personnel
12 (Un)profitability −.122* −.062 −.182** −.089 −.070 −.192** .039 −.218** −.441** .073
risk
13 Previous trading/ −.165* −.113* −.269** −.030 .014 −.163** .064 −.209** −.495** .072
(un)profitability
14 Share price −.031 −.001 −.042 −.018 −.047 −.137* .049 −.007 −.048 .002
volatility
15 Float date .117* .123* .087 .044 .015 −.039 −.050 −.002 .102 −.091
pre-dot-com
bubble
16 Technology .040 −.124* .034 .012 .098 −.008 .049 −.037 .015 .101
company
17 Founders’ −.004 −.089 .094 .039 −.132* .171** −.029 −.048 −.058 −.129*
dilution (%)
18 Executives’ .083 .411** −.194** −.032 −.116 −.017 −.136* −.115 .043 −.067
dilution (%)
19 Placing method .027 .107 .013 −.038 −.044 .066 −.121* −.205** .014 −.383**
20 Alternative −.198** .074 .139* −.088 −.304** .057 −.215** −.275** −.270** −.573**
Investment
Market flotation
(continued)
The results of the formal tests of our hypotheses are provided in Table 3. We introduced
the main explanatory variables in a stepwise fashion, which helps verify whether the main
regressors contributed to the explanatory power of the models used.
As the models show, the riskier firms are less likely to have conditional share-option
schemes, in line with the risk–incentives trade-off framework. Large firms are more likely to
introduce conditional schemes, which, again, may be a reflection of their relatively lower
level of risk compared with smaller ventures.
As Model 1 shows, nonfounding executive share ownership does not have any significant
effects on the probability of conditional schemes. Although the nonfounding executives do
have ownership in the company, the level of this ownership (mean, 4.34%) may be not
enough to provide a substitution effect with regard to incentive schemes. Thus our
Hypothesis 1 is not supported.
The results in Model 2 provide a negative impact of the executive founders’ ownership
variable on the probability of conditional schemes, thus giving marginal support in line with
Hypothesis 2a. However, contrary to Hypothesis 2b, the retained ownership of nonexecutive
founders also has a significantly negative effect. When we introduced combined founders’
ownership in Model 2, this variable had a strongly significant and negative effect. The level
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Table 2 (continued)
Variable 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
11 Departure of 1
key personnel
12 (Un)profitability .181** 1
risk
13 Previous trading/ .226** .779** 1
(un)profitability
14 Share price .074 .079 .081 1
volatility
15 Float date pre- −.338** −.181** −.224** .095 1
dot-com bubble
16 Technology .086 .073 .065 .043 .015 1
company
17 Founders’ −.081 −.091 −.068 −.057 .087 −.119 1
dilution (%)
18 Executives’ .028 −.086 −.040 −.012 .029 −.122* .109 1
dilution (%)
19 Placing −.045 .002 −.056 −.010 .068 −.101 .016 .132* 1
method
20 Alternative .104 .219** .207** −.098 −.166** −.234** .103 .082 .226** 1
Investment
Market flotation
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
of retained ownership by the founders (mean ownership of 31%) shows that they still effec-
tively control the firms, and their risk preferences are similar to nonfounding executives’. It
seems that, regardless of their role in the firm, the retained ownership of the founders pre-
vents introduction of conditional share-option schemes for executive directors, and we will
return to this result in the discussion.
As Model 3 shows, VC-backed IPOs are more likely to have incentive pay schemes with
specific performance targets attached. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is supported. The presence of
VCs positively enhances the governance of the firm, in line with our theoretical predictions.
The founders not only have considerable power within the organization via their levels of
ownership; they also often retain powerful board positions. Model 4 shows support for our
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Table 3
Logistic Regression Results
Conditional Conditional Conditional Conditional Conditional
Scheme Scheme Scheme Scheme Scheme
Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit
Dependent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant −2.027 −1.506 −1.789 −0.973 −1.908
Nonfounder executives’ ownership .002 .001 .008 .003 .010
Executive founders’ ownership −.010† −.007† −.001† −.003†
Nonexecutive founders’ ownership −.060* −.063* −.068* −.070*
Venture capitalist backing .650** .670** .689*
CEO/chair founder −.995** −.993**
Board independence 1.532†
Controls
Log turnover year-1 (£, 000) .456* .513* .504* .571** .594**
Age of company .055† .052† .056† .043 .041
Number of risk factors −.024† −.021† −.020† −.026† −.030†
Departure of key personnel −.216† −.030† −.085† −.162† −.183†
(Un)profitability −.511 −.696 −.634 −.680 −.666
Previous trading/ (un)profitability .427* .422* .407* .398* .422*
Share price volatility .000 .000 .000 −.001 −.001
Float time dot.com bubble .006 .065 .071 .059 .075
Technology company .132 .055 .001 .028 .041
Founders’ dilution −.011 −.009 −.009 −.006 −.007
Executives’ dilution .044 .036 .037 .044 .049
Placing method .112 .266 .340 .405 .355
Alternative Investment Market flotation −.364 −.207 −.076 −.164 −.093
% correct predictions 63.9 64.5 64.9 67.3 67.9
Nagelkerke R2 .130 .174 .193 21.5 22.4
Model χ2 value 17.28 23.63† 26.14† 29.40* 30.81*
†p < .10 
*p < .05
**p < .01 
***p < .001
Hypothesis 4, and the presence of conditional equity-based incentive schemes in the remuner-
ation contracts of executive directors is negatively associated with founders’ board power and
position, even though after the IPO the ownership dynamics change. Finally, Model 5 shows
there is a positive association between conditional incentive schemes and the levels of board
independence. However, this is significant at the 10% level, thus providing marginal support
for our Hypothesis 5. This result does, however, reinforce the multiple-agency effects and
potential tension that can occur within the board of such companies at the time of their IPO.
Discussion
The bringing together of behavioral agency theory and multiple-agency perspective has
enabled a more fine-grained study of the impact that ownership structure and board charac-
teristics can have on the governance of a company and, in particular, the use of equity-based
incentive schemes to tie executives to performance and increasing shareholder return. Our
analysis suggests that, in the context of IPO firms, the introduction of equity rewards tied
directly to objective performance measures is an outcome of the complex pattern of risk pref-
erences and monitoring capacities of different shareholder constituencies, including the orig-
inal founders, hired executives, and early-stage investors. The balance between these
“conflicting voices” (Hoskisson et al., 2002) in terms of the adoption of incentive schemes
also depends on board configurations, with agent-centered boards leading to the introduction
of soft share-option schemes. This finding extends the multiple-agency research (e.g.,
Arthurs et al., 2008) by suggesting that organizational outcomes of more than one agent
group may also be linked to an agent’s influence over the focal firm’s board.
The findings suggest that the founders of newly listed firms, regardless of whether they are
in executive or nonexecutive roles, are still very much in control and resist executive equity
rewards’ being tied directly to objective performance measures. More specifically, nonexecutive
founders, despite being large-block shareholders, seem to collude with the executives when set-
ting up incentive schemes. Although the multiple-agency perspective would suggest that nonex-
ecutive founders’ interests should be aligned with those of external shareholders, such as VCs,
as we argued in a preface to Hypothesis 2b, our finding indicates that their governance role is
different from that of external large-block holders. This finding is quite important because it sug-
gests a promising avenue for future theory building within the context of agency research.
The multiple-agency framework developed by Arthurs et al. (2008) does not account for
possible differences in monitoring abilities and risk preferences of principals in an IPO,
although from a behavioral agency perspective, there may be compelling reasons to argue
that founders’ framing of risk-related decisions may differ from that of external sharehold-
ers. First, despite possible dilution of their ownership, nonexecutive founders still have their
human and financial capital associated with the focal firm, and therefore they are not as risk
neutral as diversified external shareholders are. From the behavioral agency theory point of
view, this should frame their risk preferences away from extensive risk taking associated
with business strategies driven by conditional executive share options. Second, nonexecutive
founders may still be closely involved with the firm they set up in the past and helped to
develop. As principals, they may have a good idea of what the executives should be doing
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after flotation, so by observing efforts they can be sure that private and social benefits are
aligned (Prendergast, 2002). Again, this finding diminishes the importance of output-based
incentive contracts for the executives, bearing in mind their potential costs for the firm. Our
empirical finding suggests that an integration of research on risk–incentive trade-offs and
behavioral agency perspective with multiple-agency theory may enrich our understanding of
complex governance issues in threshold IPO firms.
Our analysis also suggests that the founders are still able to exercise strong board leader-
ship, including influence on incentive strategies. Tied with the power of the founder-CEO
or -chair, firms are maintaining a foundercentric structure, and founders have sufficient
power to negotiate governance arrangements that positively preserve their influence and
reward their length of service rather than their performance by allowing incentive grants to
be unconditional. However, we did not find evidence of the “good governance” roles of inde-
pendent directors, although our results are only weakly significant. This brings into question
the selection processes for these directors, as well as the extent of their independence from
the founding directors in the context of IPOs.
However, it is not totally a founder self-governing picture that emerges from our analysis.
Entrepreneurial firms that come to an IPO often have significant equity stakes held by early-
stage investors, such as VCs. Previous studies of the governance roles of VCs are rather
ambiguous in terms of their impact on incentive and monitoring systems during and after the
IPO. Most researchers emphasize the exit-oriented nature of VC investment, which may under-
mine VCs’ willingness and ability to participate effectively in governance of new issues (Black
& Gilson, 1998). Our findings clearly show that this may not be a universal case, especially
when VCs continue to own shares after the IPO. Using behavioral and multiple-agency frame-
works, we argued that VCs are a special case of block holders who appears to be actively
involved in the governance development process. However, the emphasis of this involvement
may shift from direct monitoring to more active use of performance-related incentives after the
IPO. Within this context, it is no surprise to see a positive association between VC involvement
after the IPO and the presence of conditional equity-based incentive schemes.
Previous research has recognized that governance mechanisms operate interdependently,
with overall effectiveness depending on a simultaneous operation of several mechanisms in
limiting managerial opportunism (Rediker & Seth, 1995; Walsh & Steward, 1990). Different
governance mechanisms can complement each other (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, &
Jackson, 2008; Dalton, Daily, Certo, & Roengpitya, 2003), and the cost–benefit trade-offs
among a variety of governance mechanisms would determine their use (Rediker & Seth, 1995,
p. 88). We extend this research further and make two contributions. First, we suggest that a
substitution hypothesis associated with incentives and monitoring functions of corporate gov-
ernance suggested by traditional agency perspective provides a simplified picture that does
not take into account behavioral aspects of different constituencies within the multiple-agency
framework. Our arguments and empirical findings are in line with a complementarity hypoth-
esis (e.g., Dalton et al., 2003) that seems not only to have relevance within the context of
mature firms with diffused share ownership but also to play a very important role in terms of
mitigating conflicts between founders and shareholders in the IPO firm. Second, we analyze
links between toughness of executive compensation and general governance factors in thresh-
old firms, and this area has been largely overlooked by agency research.
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With clear changes to the pay strategies happening at the point of IPO, there is the poten-
tial for further research in this area. The commanding position of the founders leads to
unconditional incentive rewards. However, research shows that founders do depart compa-
nies (either willingly or unwillingly). Once this happens, governance strategies again might
be changed. There is also the point that the majority of the schemes implemented follow a
3-year cycle from granting to vesting. One cannot ignore the possibility that grants are
unconditional, as their implementation has been no more than an experimental view of this
type of incentive scheme. Further research based on a longitudinal study of post-IPO dynam-
ics could provide insight into the changes and development of such schemes.
Conclusions
This article’s findings indicate that corporate governance is not an exogenous mechanism
that solely provides checks and controls of the efficiency with which companies are run and
whether managers make decisions in the interests of shareholders. More specifically, executive
incentive schemes are closely related to the distribution of ownership and board power among
founding and independent board members; insiders and external block holders. The next step
would be to link different governance configurations with organizational outcomes, and previ-
ous research has provided evidence of possible effects of the IPO governance characteristics
on the level of internationalization (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2003) and performance (Arthurs et
al., 2008; Certo et al., 2001; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002). Although it is beyond the ambitions
of this article to specify and test empirically complex linkages among ownership dynamics,
incentive schemes, and IPO performance, it helps map out future broad areas and questions for
empirical enquiry guided by a processual and behavioral analysis of executive compensation.
Note
1. We also used a continuous variable related to the retained ownership stake by VCs. This variable produced
similar results, but the overall explanatory power of the regression model was lower, so we have not reported these
results in this article. 
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